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Abstract
It is well established in the empirical literature that venture capital (VC)
plays an important role in the promotion of innovation at industry level and
the professionalisation of rms at micro-level. Whilst the VC-to-success
link has been well explored, the mechanism behind how and why certain
venture-backed rms are apparently more successful is an important ques-
tion that has been largely ignored within the majority of the literature. In
this paper, we ll this gap by specically analysing rmspre- and post-VC
investment decisions. By considering a two period, multi-stage game, we
analyse whether VC spurs innovation (i) directly after being granted; (ii)
indirectly by incentivising rms to increase initial research e¤orts to increase
their chances of receiving VC funding and its associated benets; or (iii)
a combination of both. Our results show that VC has both direct and in-
direct e¤ects on rmsinnovation decisions regardless of whether the rm
is successful in securing VC funding or not. Furthermore, we nd that the
commonly held assertion that venture capital spurs success is too simplistic:
whilst venture capital spurs innovation amongst the lucky, chosen few, it
unambiguously suppresses innovation of non-VC-backed rms, a result that
has been overlooked in the empirical literature. The issue of who becomes
the winner in the nal product market however is ultimately dependent
upon the extent of heterogeneity amongst rms. Further, we show that VC
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funding, equity stake and value-adding services all have impacts upon rms
incentives to invest in the rst stage.
JEL Classication: G24, L13, L2, O31
Keywords: Venture capital, innovation, rm heterogeneity, investment
and e¤ort, strategic substitutes and complements.
1 Introduction
It is now well established in the empirical literature that venture capital (hence-
forth VC) plays an important role in the promotion of innovation at industry level
and the professionalisation of rms at micro-level (Da Rin et al (2013); Dessí and
Yin (2010)). In spite of consistent empirical evidence that supports this VC-to-
success link at the micro level, there exists a dearth of theoretical investigation
that provides insight into an important and, as yet, unanswered question: how
exactly does VC spur such success?1 This question is not just of theoretical inter-
est but has important implications for public policy in fostering an environment
conducive to innovation. As Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2001) observe, some of
the most successful high-tech innovators in the US, such as Microsoft and Apple
Computers, have beneted from VC backing. Therefore, understanding the mech-
anisms behind how and why certain venture-backed rms are, apparently, more
successful is important and has, to the best of our knowledge, been largely ignored
within the majority of the literature.
In this paper, we attempt to ll this gap by focussing primarily on rms
perspectives. We ask three important questions: (i) what impact does VC have
on a rms incentives to invest in innovation?; (ii) how do rival, non-VC-backed
rms respond?; and (iii) does the prospect of receiving VC funding in the future,
and its associated benets, spur innovation ex ante?
Whilst at the industry level, there exists a long established strong, positive
relationship between VC and innovation,2 at a rm level however, VC appears to
have almost no link to innovation per se although it does appear to have other
real impacts on a rms potential for success. For example, Hellman and Puri
(2000), using a selection of survey and commercially available data for 173 hand-
picked Silicon Valley start-ups, observe that rms pursuing an innovator strategy
are more likely to obtain VC funding and see a reduction in time needed to bring
a product to market. Most intriguing, however, is their assertion that, "rms are
1So far the existing theoretical VC literature is generally focused on optimal contract the-
ory.See Da Rin et al (2013) for an excellent review.
2Given our focus on a micro level model, we do not discuss industry level results here. How-
ever, for more information see Kortum and Lerner (2000), Hirukawa and Ueda (2008), Hirukawa
and Ueda (2011), Popov and Roosenboom (2009), Popov and Roosenboom (2012), Faria and
Barbosa (2013) and Geronikolau and Papachistou (2012).
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more likely to consider VC a milestone event than obtaining nancing from some
other kind of nancier" (Hellman and Puri, 2002, p.962). Though a reason for this
is not given, all these ndings are consistent with a venture capitalist possessing
at least one of two skills: (i) a higher ability to seek out innovative rms ex ante;
and (ii) o¤ering benets beyond those of traditional nance methods through the
use value-adding services ex post.
Other work also has found remarkably similar results. Puri and Zarutskie
(2012), using US rm level data between 1981-2005, compare VC- and non-VC-
backed rms to examine relative growth rates. Whilst the results suggest that VC
may be irrelevant in the creation of new rms (accounting for only 0.11% of new
rms within the sample), they note consistently faster growth though this does not
necessarily transfer to protability. Peneder (2010), examining the impact of VC
on 132 Austrian rms, found that such rms grew 70% quicker than equivalent non-
VC-backed rms, though this growth did not extend to innovation. Chemmanur
et al (2011), using US census data, adds that total factor productivity (TFP)
is also an important signal to venture capitalists and is signicantly higher both
pre- and post-VC compared to non-funded rms. Da Rin and Penas (2007) nd
remarkably similar results using Dutch rm level data. O¤ering some additional
insight into the growth of TFP, they suggest that venture capitalists push the
rms they back into adopting more in-house R&D practices as well as investing in
absorptive capacity.
To compare whether ex ante or ex post e¤ects are more apparent, both Ka-
plan et al (2009) and Baum and Silverman (2004) examine the factors that are
important for a rm to possess in order to receive VC backing. Kaplan et al
(2009) examine whether venture capitalists are more likely to back "the horse"
(the rms business idea) or "the jockey" (the management team). They observe
that whilst VC-backed rms do, indeed, grow much faster than those that did not
receive such funding, the core business ideas also remained relatively consistent in
comparison to management. Moreover, whilst management may make a rm more
attractive, these are not related to post-VC performance.3 In similar work, Baum
and Silverman (2004), using data on 204 Canadian biotechnology start-ups and
407 incumbents, examine whether venture capitalists "pick" (ex ante selection) or
"build" (ex post mentoring) their chosen rms. They nd a combination of both
e¤ects with venture capitalists more likely to invest in rms that have already
demonstrated some innovation (alliance participation or patents) and, thereafter,
they perform better.
3In a related result, Wasserman (2003) nds that manager turnover is more likely when
managers have succesfully developed a product rather than when they have performed poorly.
The reason for this is that, once a rm has become a success, the skills that made the initial
CEO so succesful in developing a product or idea may be less important once the rm faces a
di¤erent scenario.
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These results however do not come as a surprise given the active role that
venture capitalists have been empirically demonstrated to play within a rm with
respect to their value-adding services. As Bottazzi et al (2008, p.489) astutely
stated, "the VC literature identies a broad role for the investor, which goes be-
yond the simple provision of nance. Venture capitalists may engage in a number
of value-adding activities, including monitoring, support, and control. Those ac-
tivities are largely non-contractible, yet may have real consequences".
Monitoring is perhaps one of the most obvious, and empirically tested, of all
of these value-adding services. Lerners (1995) examination of biotechnology rms
nds monitoring and control, as measured by venture capitalist board represen-
tation, were increasing in the need for oversight, as measured by CEO turnover.
Gompers (1995) nds a similar relationship between agency costs and the moni-
toring within a sample of 794 VC-backed rms. More surprisingly, it appears that
venture capitalists focus more on investment on early-stage projects for which
information asymmetries are more pronounced.4 However, monitoring a rms
activity is not a venture capitalists only value-adding service. Hellman and Puri
(2002), analysing data on 170 young high-tech Silicon Valley start-ups, examine
the impact of VC on the development of new rms. Similar to Chemmanur et al
(2011), the results suggested that a venture capitalists biggest impact was on the
professionalisation of the rm. This impact is rm wide with benets both at the
top, by replacing the original founders with external CEOs, and at the bottom,
by formulating HR policies and improving marketing strategies. Interestingly, this
result of VC rms being more likely to replace founder CEOs with external can-
didates is supported by Wasserman (2003) who suggests founder CEOs skills are
often outstripped by the rapid success that VC-backing o¤ers.5 Hochberg (2012)
also nds evidence of stronger corporate governance within VC-backed rms and
this result is made stronger when accounting for endogeneity. Finally, Bottazzi et
al (2008), using survey data collected from 124 VCs across Europe, note that the
aforementioned benets may, in fact, be related to the prior business experience of
the venture capitalist. To summarise their results, the more business experience a
venture capitalist has, the more active it is within the rm.
Whilst empirical work has done well to shed some light on how venture cap-
4Dahiya and Ray (2011) observe a similar result to Gompers (1995). However, they add
that venture capitalists may use staging as a screening tool to combat asymmetric information
and abandon failing projects earlier. Hoenen et al (2012), evaluating 1500 US based technology
rms, nd that venture capitalists use other signals, for example patents, to screen weaker rms
and o¤er stronger rms more investment. After initial round funding the impact of such signals
diminishes - no further funding benets - adding weight to a screening argument.
5Despite the apparent benets of venture capitalists replacing existing CEOs, Kaplan et al
(2012) nd no performance di¤erence between internal and external candidates once skills are
accounted for.
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italists add-value, little has been done with regards to "forward-looking selection
e¤ects". Simply put, the empirical literature assumes that the rms ex ante ac-
tions are passive and that venture capitalists are the driving force behind the
VC-to-success relationship. But why would such decisions by rms be passive?
Caselli et als (2009) examination of 154 Italian IPOs (including 37 VC-backed
rms) noted that VC was more likely to go to those rms that had already demon-
strated some innovation and similar results have been demonstrated for the US
(Hellman and Puri, 2000; Mann and Sager, 2007) and Germany (Engel and Keil-
bach, 2007). If so, then isnt it more likley that rms would change their strategic
decisions knowing that the addition of VC-backing will improve their chances of
success in the future?
In this paper, we turn the tables on the existing (empirical) literature by assum-
ing that it is the rms who undertake a more active role regarding their innovation
strategies than the venture capitalists, knowing that their ex ante investment de-
cisions will likely have a strong impact on their probability of success in the future
as securing VC backing (or not) is conditional on whether they innovate early
enough. Thus the primary goal of this paper is to analyse the e¤ects of VC on
rmsincentives to innovate at every stage of the production process. In this pa-
per, we assume that it is venture capitalists who have a rather passive role (just
like the rms in the empirical literature). Nonetheless, we try not to lose any
of the key features that VC possesses. Therefore, we assume VC funding is a
package consisting of three things: (i) an equity stake in the rm; (ii) pecuniary
funds; and (iii) value-adding services such as monitoring, implementing formal
HR procedures or improved marketing.6 To address the above issues, we consider
a stylised two-period, multi-stage game in which innovation is uncertain and rms
are of di¤erent innovative abilities. By examining both pre- and post-VC funding
decisions, we analyse whether VC spurs innovation (i) directly after being granted;
(ii) indirectly by incentivising rms to increase initial research e¤orts to increase
their chances of receiving VC funding (and its associated benets); or (iii) a com-
bination of both. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper of its kind to approach
VC in this way.
We obtain a number of theoretical results that have not been observed before,
not even empirically. First of all, we nd that, in the post-VC stage, regardless
of VC funding, "success breeds success" (propositions 3 and 10). That is to say,
we show that a good predictor of the likelihood of future success is past success:
ceteris paribus, a rm that innovates early is more likely to develop a high quality
product. Nonetheless, the addition of VC has a profound impact on competition
6To an extent, one can think of an increase in funding and/or value-adding services as a proxy
for the quality of the venture capitalist (see Bottazzi et al (2008)). However, we do not believe
the specication of our model enables us to read too much into this.
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directly after it has been granted. In essence, VC tips the balance of competition
in favour of the rm that receives it, regardless of the rms relative ability level.
It does this by inducing the VC-backed rm to invest more and the rival rm
less thereby improving the relative probability of success for the portfolio rm.
Therefore, we suggest that the commonly held belief that VC spurs innovation is
too simplistic since it overlooks the fact VC clearly damages the prospect of the
rms it does not support: not only that VC spurs innovation amongst the "lucky",
chosen few, but it unambiguously suppresses innovation of non-VC-backed rms;
an idea that has been overlooked in the empirical literature. The magnitude of
this result however is sensitive to the degree of heterogeneity between the rms.
When rms are of relatively similar abilities, VC has a more pronounced impact
on the composition of the nal product market. In fact, it can single-handedly
determine which rm is likely to be more innovative. In contrast, as rms become
more heterogeneous, VC is unable to prevent the high ability rm from being the
most likely innovator.
In the pre-VC stage, we observe two important results. First, rms may treat
e¤orts as either strategic complements or substitutes, depending upon the relative
sizes of expected future prots between subcases. When expected prots are rela-
tively higher in the symmetric (duopoly) cases, the e¤orts of a rival are positively
correlated with a rms expected prots, inducing it to invest more when a rival
does (e¤orts are strategic complements). In contrast, when asymmetric outcomes
are more valuable, the rms "compete" in e¤ort (e¤orts are strategic substitutes)
(proposition 6). Second, and most important, we nd that VC does impact on
the rms e¤ort choices indirectly, by altering their future expected payo¤s. The
equity stake of the rm impacts on initial e¤orts in two ways: i) it directly reduces
initial e¤orts by reducing expected future prots; and ii) it indirectly increases
(decreases) e¤orts if the rms treat e¤orts as strategic substitutes (complements).
Thus, the equity stake is negatively correlated with e¤ort in the rst stage if the
rms treat e¤orts as strategic complements, and ambiguously correlated if e¤orts
are treated as strategic substitutes (proposition 14). The impact of pecuniary
funding and venture capitalist expertise are however ambiguous. This ambiguity
though should not be misinterpreted as no e¤ect. Rather, one should interpret
our indirect e¤ect results more broadly: given the specication, it is likely that
future VC will have an impact on rst period e¤orts, though it is not possible to
say whether this impact is positive or negative.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we specify the model in more
detail. Section 3 analyses the benchmark, the no-VC, case. In section 4, we
examine the impact of venture capital on the rms e¤ort decisions. Section 5
concludes.
6
2 Model
We consider a two-period, multi-stage, asymmetric duopoly model in which the
quality of innovation is uncertain. We assume that two rms, i and j; have asym-
metric "innovative" abilities, ai > 0; aj > 0 such that ai  aj i.e. rm i is of higher
ability than rm j: The structure of the game can be detailed as follows:
First period
At the beginning of the rst period, given the above abilities, rms invest in
e¤ort in order to develop a prototype product that can either be of high quality
(qh) or low (ql), the actual value of which becomes known only at the end of the
rst period. The probability of discovering a certain quality of prototype depends
on a rms ability as well as on its e¤ort level. We denote the (unconditional)
probability that rm i develops a high-quality output in a certain period by 'ti;
t = 1; 2. This probability then is a function of rm is e¤ort level eti in period t as
well as its initial ability ai i.e. 'ti = '
t
i(ai; e
t
i):
7 Thus the probability that a rm
develops a high or low quality prototype (qh or ql) in the rst period is given by
Pr[qhjai; e1i ] = '1i (ai; e1i ) (1)
Pr[qljai; e1i ] = 1  '1i (ai; e1i )
where e1i is rm is e¤ort level in period one. The following assumptions charac-
terise the function 'ti(ai; e
t
i).
A1. @'ti(ai; e
t
i)=@e
t
i > 0; @
2'ti(ai; e
t
i)=@ (e
t
i)
2
< 0; 'ti(ai; 0) = 0; @'
t
i(ai; e
t
i)=@ai > 0:
A2. @2'ti(ai; e
t
i)=@e
t
i@ai > 0:
A1 says that the probability function is strictly concave in e¤ort, that a rm
can never develop a high-quality product if it puts in no e¤ort, and that, for a
given level of e¤ort, the more able the rm is, the greater is its probability of
success. Assumption A2, which states that a rms marginal returns to e¤ort are
increasing in its ability, captures the idea that a more able rm is better able to
target its e¤ort along more e¤ective research paths.
We assume that the marginal cost of e¤ort, c, is constant in every period
with c > 0. Firms choose their e¤ort level, e1i 2 [0;1), to maximise their expected
prots. Output is then realised and the quality of the rmsprototypes are revealed
to all players. There are now four possible scenarios to consider for the second
period game:
7This probability function however may change in the second period, depending upon whether
the rm discovers a high quality prototype or not - see below for the description of the second
period game.
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Case (i).
 
qil ; q
j
l

: When both rms develop low quality prototypes.
Case (ii).
 
qih; q
j
l

: When rm i develops high quality prototype whilst rm j
develops low.
Case (iii).
 
qil ; q
j
h

: When rm i develops low quality prototype whilst rm j
develops high.
Case (iv).
 
qih; q
j
h

: When both rms develop high quality prototypes.
At the beginning of the second period, given the above realisation about the
quality of the prototypes, rms compete again with respect to their e¤ort (in-
vestment) levels to produce output that can either be high (Qh) or low (Ql): The
realisation of the second period output Q is uncertain ex ante. The quality of out-
put Q discovered however determines a rms future as follows: if only one rm
innovates (i.e. develops a high quality good) whilst its rival does not, then that
rm becomes a monopolist (e.g. through the grant of some kind of a patent right)
and earns a monopoly prot M in the future period whilst its rival earns zero; if
both rms innovate (i.e. if both develop Qh) then both earn duopoly prots of DH
whereas if neither innovates (i.e. produce the low quality product Ql) then each
makes a duopoly prot of DL in the next period. Without any loss of generality,
we assume that
M > 2DH > 2DL
Obviously, rms aspire to become monopolists at the end of the second pe-
riod and choose e¤ort levels e2i 2 [0;1) to maximise their expected payo¤s at a
marginal cost of c.
Our model incorporates a learning by doinge¤ect in the following sense: if a
rm has been successful in discovering qh, then even without any VC backing, this
puts the rm in a better position to produce Qh in the second period. We capture
this idea by assuming that the probability of success function is now conditional
on the discovery of qh i.e.
Pr[Qhjqh] = i(ai; e2i ) (2)
Pr[Qljqh] = 1  i(ai; e2i )
with
i(ai; e
2
i ) = '
1
i (ai; e
2
i ) (3)
 2 (0; 1)
Equation (3) then simply states that, at any level of e¤ort, e2i 2 [0;1), a
rm that has developed a high quality prototype has a strictly higher success
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probability.8 Consequently, assumptions similar to the ones made in A1 and A2
also hold for i(ai; e
2
i ) and are summarised by A3 (i.e. i(ai; e
2
i ) is a strictly concave
function of e, is increasing in ai and shows increasing marginal return to investment
with respect to ai):
A3. @i(ai; e2i )=@e
2
i > 0; @
2i(ai; e
2
i )=@ (e
2
i )
2
< 0; i(ai; 0) = 0; @i(ai; e
2
i )=@ai >
0; and @2i(ai; e
2
i )=@e
2
i@ai > 0:
Now, in this model we consider the possibility that a rm can obtain backing
from a venture capitalist. The presence of a venture capitalist then substantially
changes the above scenario. First of all, whether a rm receives any assistance from
a venture capitalist depends entirely upon the fact whether it has developed a high
quality prototype (qh) in period 1 or not. Moreover, a VC packages is only o¤ered
to a single rm: where only one rm has developed a high quality prototype, the
VC o¤ering goes to that rm; if both rms developed qh in the rst period then
each faces equal probability of securing VC funding (which ultimately is assigned
randomlyor on the basis of certain outside criteria that are not considered in our
model). Finally, VC comes in a package consisting of:
1. An equity stake in the rm, s: The equity stake that is required by the
venture capitalist as compensation for its risk.
2. Pecuniary funding, F : This denotes the nance o¤ered to the rm.
3. Value-adding services, E: This denotes the additional benets a venture
capitalist o¤ers to the rm beyond nance such as mentoring and expert
advice.
The above assumptions keep our modelling of VC in line with those of Bottazzi
et al (2008) in so far as they imply a venture capitalist plays a far broader role in
the rm than traditional nancing methods.
How does the acquisition of a VC package a¤ect the winning rms probability
of success? With VC funding, a rms probability of success in producing Qh is
further enhanced over and above the one given by i(ai; e
2
i ): The probability of
innovation is now also a function of the amount of funding received, F , and the
value-adding services, E: We denote this function as follows:
Pr[Qhjqh; V C] = ^i(ai; e2i ) = i(ai; e2i ; E; F ) (4)
Pr[Qljqh; V C] = 1  ^i(ai; e2i )
8Note that this assumption ensures that all the properties of '1i are also transferred to i
since  is a scaler.
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where, for any e2i and ai
^i(ai; e
2
i ) > i(ai; e
2
i )
if E or F are positive. Consequently, assumptions similar to that given in A3 also
apply here (and hence are not repeated). The following assumption now captures
the specic benets of receiving VC backing, namely, how mentoring and funding
a¤ect the probability of innovation9.
A4. (i) @^i(ai; e2i )=@F > 0; (ii)@ ^i(ai; e
2
i )=@E > 0; and (iii) @
2^i(ai; e
2
i )=@e
2
i@E >
0:
A4 says that the impact of receiving mentoring and funding are strictly positive
for the rm. Additionally, part (iii) of A4 highlights the indirect e¤ect of mentoring
via a rms e¤ort level: the more value-adding services that are o¤ered by a venture
capitalist, the better able a rm becomes at targeting its e¤orts and so the marginal
returns to e¤ort increase.
Finally, if a rm developed a low-quality prototype in the rst period (i.e. qh),
then its probability of innovation remains exactly as is specied by the function
'ti i.e. it is given by '
2
i (ai; e
2
i ) in the second period.
The timing of the game can now be summarised as follows:
Stage 1: Start of rst period. Firms choose e¤ort levels, e1i 2 [0;1) given their
abilities ai; aj: Output is produced and the quality of the prototype qs; s 2
fh; lg, is revealed to all players. End of rst period.
Stage 2: Start of second period. The VC package (F;E; s) is assigned to the
winning player who then enjoys a probability of success given by ^i(:): If both
have developed high quality prototypes then VC funding is o¤ered to each
of them with equal probability. If neither rm discovers qh; neither receives
VC backing. Players who do not receive VC funding have a probability of
success given by '2i (:): Firms then invest in their e¤ort levels. Output is
realised at the end of period 2, and rms earn (future) payo¤s according to
their position in the market.
We solve the game using backward induction.
3 Benchmark: the no-VC case
In order to appreciate the impact of VC o¤ering, we rst consider the scenario
where there is no possibility of receiving a VC package. If so, then the second
period probability of innovation is given by (2).
9We use the reduced form, ^i(ai; e
2
i ), throughout.
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3.1 Second stage equilibrium
First we compute the expected second stage prots corresponding to each of the
cases (i)-(iv). Thus, the expected prot functions are
Case (i).
 
qil ; q
j
l
  both rms develop low quality prototypes
il;ljt=2NV C = (1  '2i )(1  '2j)DL + '2i'2jDH + '2i (1  '2j)M   ce2i 8 i
Case (ii). (qih; q
j
l ) - rm i develops high quality prototype while rm j develops
low
ih;ljt=2NV C = (1  2i )(1  '2j)DL + 2i'2jDH + 2i (1  '2j)M   ce2i
jh;ljt=2NV C = (1  2i )(1  '2j)DL + 2i'2jDH + '2j(1  2i )M   ce2j
Case (iii). (qil ; q
j
h) - rm i develops low quality prototype whereas rm j develops
high
il;hjt=2NV C = (1  '2i )(1  2j)DL + '2i2jDH + '2i (1  2j)M   ce2i
jl;hjt=2NV C = (1  '2i )(1  2j)DL + '22ij DH + 2j(1  '2i )M   ce2j
Case (iv). (qih; q
j
h) - both rms develop high quality prototypes
ih;hjt=2NV C = (1  2i )(1  2j)DL + 22ij DH + 2i (1  2j)M   ce2i 8 i
In the above notation for expected prots, the rst superscript denotes which
rms prots we are discussing; the rst subscript, x; y, denotes the case in which
rm i has developed a prototype of quality x 2 fh; lg and j of quality y 2 fh; lg;
the second superscript denotes the period, t 2 f1; 2g; and the second subscript
denotes whether this is the benchmark case (NV C) or the VC case (V C).
In each of the above cases, rms maximise prots by choosing respective e¤ort
levels. With some manipulation of the relevant rst order conditions, we obtain
the following set of equations corresponding to each case:
Case (i). (qil ; q
j
l )
@'2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
8 i (5)
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Case (ii). (qih; q
j
l )
@2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
@'2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  2i (M  DL  DH)
Case (iii). (qil ; q
j
h)
@'2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  2j(M  DL  DH)
@2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  '2i (M  DL  DH)
Case (iv). (qih; q
j
h)
@2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  2j(M  DL  DH)
8i
The solutions to the above rst order conditions then yield a rms reaction
function. The following proposition shows how the optimal e¤ort level of a certain
rm changes in response to its rivals.
Proposition 1 Second period e¤orts are strategic substitutes regardless of the
quality of the prototypes discovered at the end of the rst period.
Proof. See appendix 7.1
According to proposition 1, second period e¤ort levels are strategic substitutes:
any increase in one rms optimal e¤ort level leads to a decrease in that of its
rivals. The impetus for this result is the fact that, regardless of the prototypes
developed by the rms, an increase in rm is investment has two opposing e¤ects
on rm js expected prots. First, it unambiguously decreases the chances that
rm j will become a monopolist in the nal product market and, consequently,
reduces their expected returns to e¤ort. Second, it increases the expected prots
of becoming a duopolist by making it more likely that the rms will act as high
quality duopolists in the nal product market. However, given assumptions A1,
A3 and M > 2DH > 2DL, it is trivial to demonstrate that it is the former of
these e¤ects that dominates. Therefore, should rm is e¤ort level increase, rm
js expected prots are strictly lower, at all levels of e2j , than they would have been
otherwise. It is this reduction in the expected benets of investment that drives
rm j to cut its investment level in response to an increase by rm i.
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The next proposition shows that regardless of the type of prototype discovered,
the optimal e¤ort level of a rm increases in its own ability but decreases in its
rivals ability. Hence,
Proposition 2 Regardless of the type of prototype discovered
de2i
dai
> 0;
de2j
dai
< 0
Proof. See Appendix 7.2
The importance of this proposition is that it suggests that a rms ability level
is positively correlated with its e¤ort; ceteris paribus, a more able rm invests more.
The rationale behind this is a consequence of assumptions A1 and A2. As a rms
ability increases, it is induced to invest more for two reasons. First, assumption
A1 states that, for a given level of e¤ort, the more able the rm, the greater its
probability of success. Consequently, at all e¤ort levels, each unit of investment
yields a higher expected return which, in turn, induces the rm to increase its
investment level. Second, assumption A2 implies that a rms marginal returns to
e¤ort are increasing in its ability because the rm is better able to target its e¤ort
along more e¤ective research paths. This further increases the returns to e¤ort,
once again spurring a rm to invest more. This increased investment of a more
able rm, combined with proposition 1 thensuggests that whilst a higher ability
rm will invest more, its rival will be induced to invest less.
Proposition 2 further implies that it is possible to determine, in every case,
which rm will invest the most. In the symmetric cases, (ie cases (i) and (iv)), this
is straightforward to detemine: assuming that, initially, the rms are symmetric
with respect to their abilities (ai = aj), their equilibrium e¤ort levels will be the
same. If however rm i is then allowed to become the high ability rm, such that
ai = aj + " where " > 0 is of small value, then by propositions 1 and 2, this will
imply that the e¤ort level of rm i will be striclty highere whereas that of rm j
will be strictly lower relative to the symmetric case where ai = aj. This on the
other hand implies that in the cases in which the rms have developed prototypes
of similar qualities, the high ability rm invariably invests more and is the more
likely innovator. A similar result holds for the asymmetric case (ii).10 We can
10To see that, note that the the relevant rst order conditions (after applying equation (3))
are
@'2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  '2j (M  DL  DH)
(6)
@'2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  '2i (M  DL  DH)
(7)
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therefore conclude, following propositions 1 and 2, that in all cases of (i), (ii) and
(iv) the high-ability rm becomes the likely winner. In case (iv), where rm i
(the high ability rm) invests strictly less than rm j;although it is not possible
to conclude unambiguously which rm becomes the likey winner, we observe that
if rm i still may become the likely winner by discovering Qh in the nal stage of
the game if it is su¢ ciently able.
Finally, the following proposition shows that it is possible to order the second
stage e¤ort levels conditional on the type of prototype discovered in the rst stage.
Proposition 3 Regardless of the quality of a rivals prototype, a rm always in-
vests strictly more e¤ort when it has discovered a high quality prototype. More
formally:
e2i jqih;qjs > e
2
i jqil ;qjs
for all s 2 fl; hg.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3
Proposition 3 suggests that a rm will invest more, and be more likely to
innovate, if it was successful in developing a high quality prototype at the end
of the rst stage. One important implication of proposition 3 then is that past
success is a good indicator of the likeliness of future successes: once a rm has
demonstrated an ability to successfully innovate, it becomesmore likely to innovate
in the future than if it had failed to innovate initially. Proposition 2 enables us to
order the rmsprot levels as given by the following corollary.
Corollary 4 Regardless of the quality of a rivals prototype, a rms expected
prots are higher when it has developed a high quality prototype. Formally,
ih;sjt=2NV C > il;sjt=2NV C
for all s 2 fl; hg
Proof. This proof is trivial and so it is omitted.
Given the result in proposition 3, the implication of corollary 4 is straight-
forward: when a rm develops a high quality prototype, its expected returns to
e¤ort as measured in terms of both expected monopoly and duopoly prots, are
strictly greater compared to the case where it invents a low quality protoptype.
Assuming both rms are of the same ability and so the investment levels being identical then
yields
@'2i
@e2i
<
@'2j
@e2j
) that a symmetric equilibrium cannot be supported.
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Thus when a rm has been successful in developing a high quality prototype, each
additional unit of e¤ort yields larger increases in expected prots. These additional
returns on investment induce a rm to increase their innovative e¤orts which,
in turn, yield higher levels of expected prots an outcome that is independent
of the quality of the rivals prototype implying that initial success has tangible
consequences. To reiterate a previous point, these results suggest that past success
is a good indicator of the likeliness of future successes.
3.2 First stage equilibrium
In the rst period, the rmsexpected prot functions are given by
ijt=1NV C = (1  '1i )(1  '1j)il;ljt=2NV C + '1i'1jih;hjt=2NV C
+ '1i (1  '1j)ih;ljt=2NV C + (1  '1i )'1jil;hjt=2NV C   ce1i
jjt=1NV C = (1  '1i )(1  '1j)jl;ljt=2NV C + '1i'1jjh;hjt=2NV C
+ '1i (1  '1j)jh;ljt=2NV C + (1  '1i )'1jjl;hjt=2NV C   ce1j
With a little manipulation of the relevant rst order conditions one obtains
@'1i
@e1i
=
c
(1  '1j)(ih;ljt=2NV C   il;ljt=2NV C) + '1j [ih;hjt=2NV C   il;hjt=2NV C ]
(8)
@'1j
@e1j
=
c
(1  '1i )(jl;hjt=2NV C   jl;ljt=2NV C) + '1i [jh;hjt=2NV C   jh;ljt=2NV C ]
(9)
These follow a similar functional form to those in the second stage but are now
dependent on the second periods expected prots. However, as the following
proposition demonstrates, each rms rst period e¤orts may be treated as either
strategic substitutes or complements.
Proposition 5 First period e¤orts can be treated as either strategic substitutes or
complements. Furthermore, it is possible that one rm treats e¤orts as a strategic
substitutes whilst the other treats them as complements.
Proof. See appendix 7.4
Thus, in contrast to second period e¤orts, rms may treat e¤ort either as strate-
gic substitutes or complements. The above result can be explained as follows: (i)
Firms treat e¤orts as strategic substitutes if and only if the expected prots of
becoming the sole developer of a high quality prototype are su¢ ciently large. In
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this scenario, additional investment by one rm strictly decreases the probability
that the rival rm will be able to become the sole developer of a high quality
prototype. As this makes up a signicant proportion of a rms expected prots,
relative to the other cases, an increase in the e¤orts of one rm signicantly re-
duces the expected prots of the other. Therefore, investment by one rm reduces
the incentives of its rival to invest in the rst place and, consequently, the rival
rms e¤ort level falls. (ii) In contrast, rms treat e¤orts as strategic complements
when the expected prots of being the sole developer of a high quality prototype
are smaller so that there is a greater emphasis on the expected payo¤s in the
symmetric (duopoly) cases. When these are su¢ ciently large, the investment of
a rival actually increases the expected protability of the rm. In essence, the
prots of a rm are positively correlated with a rival rms invesment. Therefore,
when one rm increases its e¤ort levels, this induces the other rm to do the
same. (iii) An interesting third possibility, when rms have asymmetric abilities
so that their expected prots are di¤erent, can also arise where both rms may
treat e¤ort di¤erently such that one rms reaction function slopes down whilst
the other rms slopes up. In essence, the rmse¤ort decisions becomes a game
of "cat and mouse", with one rm trying to match the other, which is trying to
get away.11 In fact, this additional result may o¤er some theoretical grounding
for the empirical observation that some rms adopt "innovator" strategies whilst
others adopt "imitator" strategies (Hellman and Puri , 2000). In our model, the
"innovators" are those rm that expect to make relatively large prots if they can
innovate early (the rm that treats e¤orts as substitutes). In contrast, "imitators"
are driven to invest not because they expect to be innovators alone, but because
their expected prots are positively correlated with the e¤orts of their rival (the
rm that treats e¤orts as complements). Therefore, in equilibrium, both rms
are trying to balance two opposing forces. In the case of the "innovator", they
wish to maximise their prots without attracting too much investment by an "im-
itator". In contrast, an "imitator" wishes to invest as much as possible, without
suppressing too much innovative e¤ort of the "innovator".
11Mathematically this is not problematic so long as the reaction functions allow for stability
and uniqueness. To that end, we must ensure that rms do not "overreact" to a change in a
rivals choice. Formally (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991),R0i R0j < 1
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4 E¤ects of VC on rmsinnovative incentives
Now consider the possibility that a rm can receive o¤erings from a venture cap-
italist. The possibility of securing VC backing then changes the above scenario
substantially. Recall that a VC package, (s; E; F ), is given to only one rm that
has developed a high quality prototype where the winning rm now has a probabil-
ity of innovation function given by equation (4). Further, recall that if both rms
developed a high quality prototypes then each receives VC with equal probability,
where the rm that is not successful in receiving the VC o¤ering (despite the fact
that it had developed a high-quality prototype) faces the probability i(ai; e
2
i ).
Finally, recall that the probability of success function for the rm that devel-
oped a low quality prototype remains unchanged i.e. it is given by '2i (ai; e
2
i ) =
i(ai; e
2
i ; 0; 0) - see equation (3)
As in the No-VC case, we start our analysis with the second stage game.
4.1 Second stage equilibrium
In the presence of VC, the expected prots for each case are given by
Case (i). (qil ; q
j
l )
il;ljt=2V C = (1  '2i )(1  '2j)DL + '2i'2jDH + '2i (1  '2j)M   ce2i 8 i
Case (ii). (qih; q
j
l )
ih;ljt=2V C = (1  s)

(1  b2i )(1  '2j)DL + b2i'2jDH + b2i (1  '2j)M   ce2i 
jh;ljt=2V C = (1  b2i )(1  '2j)DL + b2i'2jDH + '2j(1  b2i )M   ce2j
Case (iii). (qil ; q
j
h)
il;hjt=2V C = (1  '2i )(1  b2j)DL + '2i b2jDH + '2i (1  b2j)M   ce2i
jl;hjt=2V C = (1  s)

(1  '2i )(1  b2j)DL + '2i b2jDH + b2j(1  '2i )M   ce2j
Case (iv). (qih; q
j
h). Here,
(a) If rm i received VC
ih;hjt=2V Ci = (1  s)

(1  b2i )(1  2j)DL + b2i2jDH + b2i (1  2j)M   ce2i 
jh;hjt=2V Ci = (1  b2i )(1  2j)DL + b2i2jDH + 2j(1  b2i )M   ce2j
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(b) If rm j received VC
ih;hjt=2V Cj = (1  s)

(1  b2i )(1  2j)DL + b2i2jDH + b2i (1  2j)M   ce2i 
jh;hjt=2V Cj = (1  b2i )(1  2j)DL + b2i2jDH + 2j(1  b2i )M   ce2j
where the (altered) second subscript V Cx in case (iv) now implies that rm x 2
fi; jg received VC when both rms were eligible.
Each rm now maximises their second period payo¤s. Then, using the rst
order conditions - and with a little manipulation - we nd that, for each of the
cases (i) - (iv), the rmse¤ort level decisions are given by
Case (i). (qil ; q
j
l )
@'2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  '2j)(M  DL  DH)
8 i
Case (ii). (qih; q
j
l )
@^2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  '2j)(M  DL  DH)
@'2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2i )(M  DL  DH)
Case (iii). (qil ; q
j
h)
@'2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2j)(M  DL  DH)
@^2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  '2i )(M  DL  DH)
Case (iv). (qih; q
j
h)
i) If rm i received VC
@^2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  2j)(M  DL  DH)
@2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2i )(M  DL  DH)
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ii) If rm j received VC
@2i
@e2i
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2j)(M  DL  DH)
@^2j
@e2j
=
c
(M  DL)  (1  2i )(M  DL  DH)
The following proposition follows from the above equations.
Proposition 6 Second period e¤orts are always strategic substitutes regardless of
the quality of prototype developed.
Proof. The proof is identical in style to that of proposition 3 and so is omitted.
Nonetheless, the result still hinges on the assumptions made in A1 - A3 and M >
2DH > 2DL.
Thus, similar to proposition 3, proposition 6 also states that regardless of the
prototypes developed by the rms, an increase in rm is investment level will
decrease rm js e¤ort level. The intuition behind this proposition is also similar
to that of proposition 3: that is any increase in rm is e¤ort makes it less likely
that rm j will become a monopolist, whilst it strictly increases the probability
that rm j will become a high (and not low) quality duopolist. Given assumption
A1, A3 and M > 2DH > 2DL, it can then be easily checked that the reduction in
expected monopoly prots dominates which then incentivises rm j to cut back
on its investment level.
Further, similar to the No-VC case, second period e¤ort levels are determined
by a rms relative ability.
Remark 7 Regardless of the type of prototype discovered
de2i
dai
> 0;
de2j
dai
< 0
Proof. The proof is almost identical to that of proposition 2 and so is omitted.
Nonetheless, the result still hinges on the assumptions made in A1 - A3 and M >
2DH > 2DL.
The intuition behind remark 7 is identical to that of proposition 2 and is driven
by assumptions A1 and A2. A higher ability makes a rm more likely to develop
a high quality good and better able to target its e¤orts, increasing the expected
returns to e¤ort. Consequently, the rms are induced to invest more when they
are of higher ability.
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However, it is no longer just ability that plays a role in the determining the
future successes of the rms. Instead, the VC package now plays crucial role. The
following proposition demonstrates the impact VC has on the rmsincentives to
innovate.
Proposition 8 Assuming that rm i receives VC backing, we observe12
de2i
dF
> 0;
de2j
dF
< 0 (10)
de2i
dE
> 0;
de2j
dE
< 0 (11)
de2i
ds
=
de2i
ds
= 0 (12)
Proof. See Appendix 7.5
The crucial element of proposition 8 is that VC unambiguously increases the
probability of successful innovation for the rm that is chosen, by inducing it to
invest more. In contrast, the non-VC backed rm that must compete against a
VC-backed rival invests less and becomes less likely to develop a high quality good.
Consequently, VC tips the balance of competition in favour of the rm it backs.
The two particular elements of the VC package that generate this result are the
VC funding F, and the VC value-adding and mentoring services. First, the addi-
tion of pecuniary funding, F , makes a rm more likely to innovate at all levels of
e¤ort. Thus, a rm with nancial backing is, in a sense, able to buy success as, re-
gardless of their e¤orts or ability, the rm may now have access to new equipments
or better quality materials. It is the addition of nance, and the greater likelihood
that they innovate successfully, that makes e¤ort more valuable and induces them
to invest more. Second, a venture capitalist o¤ers value-adding services ranging
from simply mentoring rms and improving marketing strategies to overhauling
corporate governance completely. Regardless of the extent of their involvement,
venture capitalistsown e¤orts are likely to have two impacts: i) increases to E
may simply raise the probability of success at all e¤ort levels by allowing entre-
preneurs more time to focus on innovation; or ii) a venture capitalist may use its
expertise and market knowledge to channel the entrepreneurs e¤orts down more
fruitful research pathways. In both cases, these strictly increase the returns to
each additional unit of e¤ort of the winning rm. Therefore, the existence of value
adding services creates an environment that enables a rm to invest more.13
Given proposition 8, we are now able to determine whether a rm would invest
more or less compared to the no-VC case, as the following corollary explains.
12Results for rm j can be derived by symmetry.
13Given the specication of the model it is not possible to determine which e¤ect, E or F , is
larger.
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Corollary 9 Compared to the benchmark case, a rm that has received VC funding
invests strictly more than it would have done without VC-backing. Furthermore, a
non-VC backed rm invests strictly less, compared to the benchmark case, when it
faces a VC-backed rival.
Proof. Follows directly from proposition 8.
The intuition behind this result follows directly from the benets of funding
and venture capitalist expertise: by increasing the returns to each additional unit
of e¤ort, venture capitalists induce VC-backed rms to invest more. If so, then by
proposition (6) the non-winning rm invests strictly less.
One important implication of this corollary, which has so far been largely over-
looked in the literature, is that whilst VC does spur innovation and increases the
probability of success for the rm that receives it, there are also casualties. If a
rm is competing against a VC backed rival it becomes less likely to develop a high
quality nal good than if no VC were present. Consequently, VC spurs innovation
not only by incentivising (future) innovative e¤orts of an early innovator, but also
by suppressing the e¤orts of rms that failed to innovate initially. This unique
aspect of our result contributes signicantly to the currently existing VC literature
which only talks about the fact that VC spurs success but ignores completely the
mechanism behind such success.
The following proposition highlights the imporatnce of early innovation.
Proposition 10 Regardless of the quality of a rivals prototype, a rm invests
strictly more if it has developed a high quality prototype. Moreover, in the cases in
which a rm has developed a high quality prototype, it invests more if it recieves
VC-funding than if does not.
e2i jqih;qjsjV Ci > e
2
i jqih;qjsjV Cj > e
2
i jqil ;qjs
Proof. See Appendix 7.6
The proposition therefore says whilst similar to the proposition 3 in the non-VC
benchmark, a rm is always more likely to develop a high quality product if it has
developed a high quality prototype regardless of the quality of its rivals prototype
developed by a rival, securing VC backing further augments a rms innovative
process, by improving its likelihood of success. Thus, the fact that "success still
breeds success" is even stronger in the presence of VC backing.
Finally, we also observe the following:
Corollary 11 Regardless of the quality of a rivals prototype, a rms expected
prots are higher when it has received VC funding. More formally,
ih;sjt=2V Ci > ih;sjt=2V Cj > il;sjt=2V C
Proof. The proof is trivial and so it is omitted.
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Even though "success breeds success", the question is why? Given assumptions
A1 - A4 and equation (4), it becomes apparent that, with no additional e¤ort on
the part of the entrepreneur, its expected prots are larger if it has successfully
innovated a high quality prototype. Therefore, each additional unit of e¤ort is
more valuable and generates higher levels of marginal prot. This incentivises the
rm to invest more and generates larger expected prots than if it had failed to
innovate at the end of the rst stage.14
Finally, it is important to understand which rm is most likely to develop a
high quality nal good.15 Assuming that rm i is the high ability rm, ai > aj,
it is obvious that in cases (ii) and (iv.i) (ie (qih; q
j
l ) and (q
i
h; q
j
hjV Ci)) cases rm
i is more likely to succeed. This follows directly from remark 7 and proposition
8. However, there are also two ambiguous cases where rm j has received VC
funding: (qil ; q
j
h) and (q
i
h; q
j
hjV Cj). Intuitively, assuming that the rms are initially
of equal ability, it must be that rm j invests more in the (qil ; q
j
h) and (q
i
h; q
j
hjV Cj)
cases, where it is VC-backed. However, by remark 7, an increase in rm is ability
will unambiguously increase e2i and decrease e
2
j . This implies that for any VC
package, (s, E, F ), as long as ai is su¢ ciently large the more able rm is the
more likely rm develop a high quality nal product regardless of the quality of
its prototype. However, as E and F increase this becomes harder and, therefore,
less likely. For large values of E and F it is more probable that the likely winner is
determined by who is chosen to receive VC funding. That is, the rm that receives
the VC becomes, somewhat automatically, the stronger rm. Hence, depending the
entrepreneursrelative abilities and the specication of the VC package on o¤er,
VC funding may have either a small or large impact on the likely composition
of the nal product market. One can therefore expect to see di¤erent impacts of
VC funding across di¤erent industries depending upon the degree of heterogeneity
amongst rms in di¤erent industries.
Given that the nal outcome of who becomes the winner depends heavily
upon the rmse¤ort level in the rst period, we now turn to analyse how the
prospect of securing VC backing alters rmsinitial e¤ort levels.
14It is the shape of the probability functions that drives this result. As ^ and  lie strictly above
', rms are more likely to succeed, at any level of ability or e¤ort, if they have demonstrated
some initial innovative ability.
15We ignore the case in which both rms develop low quality prototypes as this is identical to
the no-VC case.
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4.2 First stage equilibrium
The rst stage expected prots are given by
ijt=1V C = (1  '1i )(1  '1j)il;ljt=2V C +
1
2
'1i'
1
j
h
ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj
i
+ '1i (1  '1j)ih;ljt=2V C + (1  '1i )'1jil;hjt=2V C   ce1i
jjt=1V C = (1  '1i )(1  '1j)jl;ljt=2V C +
1
2
'1i'
1
j
h
jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj
i
+ '1i (1  '1j)jh;ljt=2NV C + (1  '1i )'1jjl;hjt=2NV C   ce1j
Where the rst order conditions yield
@'1i
@e1i
=
c(
(1  '1j)

ih;ljt=2V C   il;ljt=2V C

+'1j
h
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

  il;hjt=2V C
i ) (13)
@'1j
@e1j
=
c(
(1  '1i )

jl;hjt=2V C   jl;ljt=2V C

+'1i
h
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

  jh;ljt=2V C
i ) (14)
Similar to the No-VC case, rst period e¤orts are determined by expected
future prots. However, as the following proposition demonstrates, the reaction
functions of each rm can be either upward or downward sloping.
Proposition 12 In the VC case, rst period e¤orts can be treated as either strate-
gic substitutes or complements. Additionally, one rm may treat e¤orts as a strate-
gic substitutes whilst another treats e¤orts as complements.
Proof. See Appendix 7.7
Similar to the mechanism to proposition 5, proposition 12 suggests rms con-
sider e¤orts as strategic substitutes if and only if the expected prots of becoming
the sole developer of a high quality prototype are su¢ ciently large. The addition
of venture capital, which unambiguously increases (decreases) expected prots for
the VC-backed (non-VC-backed) rm, does not alter this intuition. Thus, when
the expected gains are disproportionately large in the case in which only one rm
develops a high quality prototype, any increase in e¤ort by a rival rm signicantly
reduces a rms expected prots. Consequently, an increase in one rms e¤ort
reduces the incentive for the other to invest, regardless of whether that rm is VC-
backed or not. In contrast, when the expected prots from symmetric innovation
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are relatively large, the expected prots of one rm become positively correlated
with the e¤ort of its rival. Therefore, when a rival rm invests more, a rm is
incentivised to invest more too.
These results suggest that, whilst VC funding clearly has an impact on e¤ort
levels by inuencing expected second period prots, the mechanisms by which
the rms compete remain unchanged. Both rms may still treat e¤ort as strategic
complements, substitutes or a combination of the two, but they still act in a similar
way to the no-VC case. This is, perhaps, one of venture capitals greatest strengths:
whilst it does inuence the outcome, it does not a¤ect the mechanism.16
An important question to ask then is: how does the lure of VC impact rms
e¤ort levels in the rst period? Firstly, as the following remark shows, whilst the
pecuniary funding F and venture capitalistse¤ort E do have an impact on rms
rst period e¤ort level, the magnitudes of those cannot (yet) be quantied. 17
Remark 13 The impact of pecuniary funding, F , and venture capitalist e¤ort, E,
on rst period e¤ort is ambiguous, regardless of whether rms treat e¤ort as strate-
gic substitutes or complements.
Proof. See Appendix 7.8
Despite that, Proposition 14 demonstrates the impact of equity stake s on
rmsrst period incentives to invest.
Proposition 14 When rms treat e¤ort as strategic complements, the higher the
equity stake in the rm, the lower the e¤ort level, or
de1i
ds
< 0 8 i
However, when rms treat e¤orts as strategic substitutes the e¤ect of the equity
stake can be either positive or negative.
Proof. See Appendix 7.9
What proposition 14 reveals is that the venture capitalists equity stake has
both a direct and indirect impact on a rms e¤ort choice. The direct e¤ect is
unambiguously negative: as the venture capitalists equity stake becomes larger,
a rm will want to invest less in the rst period. Intuitively, as a the venture
16It is the use of an equity stake that is the reason for this observation. This is, perhaps, why
venture capitalists use equity shares and not traditional methods, so as to avoid altering the
incentives of the rms (see Brander and Lewis (1986)).
17This is mainly because the interplay of numerous factors (see the proof) makes it di¢ cult to
gauge which e¤ect domintates which.
24
capitalists share of future prots become larger, there is less incentive for the
rm to invest because the expected prots of innovation are reduced. In contrast,
the indirect e¤ect accounts for a rms reaction to a fall in a rivals investment
caused by an increase in the equity stake. The indirect e¤ects therefore depends
upon whether rst period e¤orst are strategic substitutes or complements. Where
the rms treat e¤orts as strategic substitutes, one rm will increase its research
e¤orts in response to a reduction in a rivals. Therefore, as an increase in the
equity stake unambiguously puts downward pressure on the investment decisions
of both rms, this indirectly induces the rms to invest more; a positive indirect
e¤ect. Consequently, whether rms actually invest more or less is determined
by the balance of these opposing forces. In contrast, where rms treat e¤orts as
strategic complements, a fall in a rivals investment will induce a rm to invest less
too; a negative indirect e¤ect. The reason behind this is that, a rms expected
prots are positively correlated with the e¤ort level of its rival. Therefore, as a
higher equity stake reduces the rival rms incentives to invest, this leads a rm
to reduce their e¤ort levels too. Thus, in the strategic complements case both the
direct and indirect e¤ects act in the same direction, and it must be that increasing
the equity stake reduces investments.
5 Conclusion
This paper set out to address a notable imbalance in the VC literature, that
venture capitalists were the sole force behind the VC-to-success link. This link
however is incomplete as it does not address the mechanism through which VC
alters rms strategic investment decisions that can lead to innovation. In this
paper we have we examined the VC-to-success link from the rms perspectives,
in order to understand the exact route through which VC can lead to successful
innovation. Specically, we have examined the pre- and post-VC funding deci-
sions to determine whether VC-funding spurs innovation (i) directly after being
granted; (ii) indirectly by incentivising rms to increase initial research e¤orts to
increase their chances of receiving VC funding (and its associated benets); or
(iii) a combination of both. Our analysis shows that VC has both direct (ex post)
and indirect (ex ante) implications for a rms investment decisions in both cases
where a rm has been successful in securing VC funding and where it has not.
Our second stage results clearly demonstrated a direct link between VC and
innovation/success. First, it appears that "success breeds success", in so far as
a predictor of future innovation appears to be past innovative success. Second,
and most important, the addition of venture-backing to a rm tips the balance
of competition in its favour. The addition of funding enables rms to, in essence,
"buy success", by spending money on better equipment or materials. The addition
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of value-adding services is important for two reasons: it (i) directly increases the
likelihood of success by enabling an entrepreneur to focus on innovation; and ii)
a venture capitalists expertise may indirectly benet a rm if it is able to direct
it along more fruitful research pathways. We show that whilst the addition of
VC benets the rm that receives it, it unambiguously reduces the likelihood of
innovation for all other rms that did not receive VC backing. Therefore, the
commonly held belief that VC spurs innovation is only a partial truth. Whilst it is
true that VC can indeed spur innovation (and does indeed do so in many circum-
stances) by increasing the likelihood of success of the winning rm and lowering
that for the loserrms, the ultimate e¤ect however is dependent upon the extent
of heterogeneity amongst rm. The more symmetric the rms are, stronger is the
impact of VC funding on the VC-backed rms probability of success, in which
case VC becomes an important factor in determining the ultimate composition of
the nal product market.
We show that VC also impacts rmsinitial e¤ort levels ie before VC is o¤ered
to rms. It does so by altering rmsfuture expected prot levels. In this context,
we have shown that venture capitalistsequity stake plays a prominent role where it
impacts rmsintitial e¤ort levels in two ways: it (i) directly reduces initial e¤orts
by reducing expected future prots; and it (ii) indirectly increases (decreases)
e¤orts if the rms treat e¤orts as strategic substitutes (complements). Finally, we
have shown that the extent of VC nance and the value-adding services also have
an impact upon rmsintial e¤ort levels although it was not possible to determine
the exact magnitudes of such e¤ects without assigning specic functional forms
(and this remains as a future plan of work).
We believe, our paper is one the rst theoretical analyses that examines the
VC-to-success link at a micro level, from rmsperspectives. Analysing such mech-
anisms are of utmost importance as they have serious public policy implications
for fostering environments conducive to economic growth and innovation.
There are several ways the model can be further extended. Recently, a rel-
atively new body of the empirical literature has started to uncover additional
benets derived from the interactions between rms backed by a single venture
capitalist i:e: the issue of strategic alliances.18 It would be useful to see whether
such interactions would further enhance a rms chances of innovation or whether
they would still compete in e¤orts in post-VC stage.
18For evidence, see Lindsey (2008) and Ozmel et al (2013)
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The slope of the reaction functions are given by
R
0
i =  
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j
l

rst. Then observe that
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by assumption A1 (concavity) and M > 2DH > 2DL. As both probability func-
tions, '2i (ai; e
2
i ) and 
2
i (ai; e
2
i ), possess similar properties (by A1 and A3) it then
follows immediately that that the other cases yield the same result.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof holds for all cases (i) - (iv) given the assumptions in A1 - A3.
Consequently, we only prove this for the case (qil ; q
j
l ), but similar proofs exist for
all other cases. We solve this comparative static using Cramers rule where
Ax = b24 @2il;ljt=2NVC@(e2i )2 @2il;ljt=2NVC@e2i @e2j
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Using this, we can obtain dei2
dai
by substituting ai = x and using
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Signing these equations is quite simple. First,
Ae2i ai is strictly positive given
the assumptions A1 and A2. The sign of jAj is harder to interpret. However,
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assuming uniqueness and stability holds, or
1
jR0ij
>
R0j (17)
we observe
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Consequently, jAj > 0 and de2i
dai
> 0.
The case for
de2j
dai
is similar and we obtain
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which is strictly negative. Consequently
de2j
dai
< 0
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The proof for proposition 3 is similar for both rms. Therefore, we only
present the proof for rm i.
First, comparing e2i jqih;qjl and e
2
i jqil ;qjl , and recalling i(ai; e
2
i ) = 'i(ai; e
2
i ), we
observe
@'2i
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jqih;qjl =
c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
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@e2i
jqil ;qjl =
c
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Assuming across both cases rm i invests symmetrically, we observe
@'2i
@e2i
jqih;qjl <
@'2i
@e2i
jqil ;qjl
Given the assumptions made in A1 and A3, it must be that this implies that
rm i would like to: i) invest strictly more where it has developed a high quality
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prototype; ii) invest strictly less where it has developed a low quality prototype;
or iii) some combination of i) and ii). Either way, when rm j has developed a
low quality prototype, rm i invests more when it has developed a high quality
prototype.
Second, comparing e2i jqih;qjh and e
2
i jqil ;qjh we observe
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2c
(M  DL)  '2j(M  DL  DH)
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Again, a symmetric level of e¤ort cannot be observed. More formally, we nd
@'2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh <
@'2i
@e2i
jqil ;qjh
which implies e2i jqih;qjh > e
2
i jqil ;qjh. Therefore, regardless of the prototype developed
by rm j, rm i always invests strictly more when it has developed a high quality
prototype.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The slope of rm is reaction function depends upon
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Given assumptions A1, A3 and corollary 4 it must be that the former of these
equations is strictly negative. In contrast, corollary 4 is not su¢ cient to determine
the sign of the second order cross partial derivative. However, we are able to
determine that the second order cross partial derivative of rm i is negative, and
so e¤orts are treated as strategic substitutes, if and only if
ih;ljt=2NV C   il;ljt=2NV C > ih;hjt=2NV C   il;hjt=2NV C (18)
Given this, it is trivial to note that in the case of rm j e¤ort is treated as strategic
substitutes if and only if
jl;hjt=2NV C   jl;ljt=2NV C > jh;hjt=2NV C   jh;ljt=2NV C (19)
Where both of these equations are met both rms act as strategic substitutes.
If neither of these are met then both rms act as strategic complements. Interest-
ingly, it is possible that one treats e¤ort as a strategic substitute whilst the other
strategic compliments.
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7.5 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. This proof is done for the case (qih; q
i
l) but holds for all other cases due to
assumptions A1, A3, A4 andM > 2DH > 2DL. Recall that this implies rm i has
received VC funding as the sole developer of a high quality prototype. We solve
the comparative statics using Cramers rule, or
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where x could represent either venture capitalist e¤ort, E, or pecuniary funding,
F .
First, solving the comparative statics with respect to F , we nd
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Given assumptions A1, A3, A4 andM > 2DH > 2DL, it is trivial that
Ae2iF  >
0 but jAj is not so trivial to sign. However, it is possible to observe that a unique
and stable equilibrium exists if
1
jR0ij
>
R0j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holds. It turns out this this is the case if
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Therefore, jAj is strictly positive too and therefore de2i
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> 0.
Similarly, the e¤ects of pecuniary funding on rm j can simply be derived from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which is again strictly negative given assumptions A1, A3, A4 and M > 2DH >
2DL. Note that since the sign of jAj, positive, remains unchanged and so de
2
j
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< 0.
Determining the impact of venture capitalist e¤ort is derived in a similar way,
with the sign on jAj still unchanged. For the sake of brevity, we simply state
Ae2iE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Again the signs of these equations are determined by assumptions A1, A3, A4 and
M > 2DH > 2DL. Given that
Ae2iE (Ae2jE) is strictly positive (negative), it is
easy to observe both de
2
i
dE
> 0 and
de2j
dE
< 0.
As it has already been noted, assumptions A1 - A4 cover all the possible func-
tional forms that may be present but assume that, whilst they are not identical,
they all act in a similar way. Consequently, the result of this case extends to all
other VC cases.
It is trivial to demonstrate that the equity stake, s, has no impact given the
rst order conditions are independent of s. Consequently, equity does not impact
upon the optimal investment decision and has no impact on either e2i or e
2
j .
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7.6 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. The proof of proposition 10 is complex simply because there are a large
number of cases to examine. However, given the almost identical nature of the
proofs, we only derive the result for the case in which s = h, or the rival rm has
developed a high quality prototype.
First, assume that rm j has developed a high quality prototype such that the
e¤ort ordering becomes
e2i jqih;qjhV Ci > e
2
i jqih;qjhjV Cj > e
2
i jqil ;qjh
Comparing e2i jqih;qjhV Ci to e
2
i jqih;qjhjV Cj we observe
@^2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh;V Ci =
c
(M  DL)  (1  2j)(M  DL  DH)
@2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh;V Cj =
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2j)(M  DL  DH)
When ai = aj and E = F = 0, it is obvious given assumptions A1 - A4 that the
e¤ort levels are equal, e2i = e
2
j = e
. Furthermore, given the results derived in
remark 7 and proposition 8, it is known that should a rm receive VC backing,
any increases in venture capitalist e¤ort or funding will strictly increase that rms
investment levels and decrease that of its rival. Therefore, starting from a purely
symmetric case, ai = aj and E = F = 0, when rm i receives venture capital,
holding abilities constant, it must be that e2i > e
 > e2j . Similarly, were rm j to
receive funding, e2j > e
 > e2i . Therefore, it must be that a rm invests more when
it is VC-backed rather than its rival. The addition of asymmetric abilities does
nothing to alter this result.
Second, in the other relevant case, e2i jqih;qjhjV Cj > e
2
i jqil ;qjh, and after using equa-
tion (3) we observe
@'2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh;V Cj =
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2j)(M  DL  DH)
@'2i
@e2i
jqil ;qjh =
c
(M  DL)  (1  ^2j)(M  DL  DH)
It is obvious that, for any given level of e¤ort by rm j, it must be that
@'2i
@e2i
jqih;qjh;V Cj <
@'2i
@e2i
jqil ;qjh
Therefore, it is the case in which rm i has developed a high quality prototype,
but not received VC funding, that yields a greater level of investment.
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7.7 Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. The proof is determined by the relevant rst and second order equations,
given by
@2ijt=1NV C
@(e2i )
2
=
@2'1i
@(e1i )
2

(1  '1j)

ih;ljt=2V C   il;ljt=2V C

+ '1j

1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

  il;hjt=2V C

@2ijt=1NV C
@e1i@e
1
j
=
@'1i
@e1i
@'1j
@e1j

1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

+ il;ljt=2V C

   ih;ljt=2V C + il;hjt=2V C
Given the prot ordering in corollary 11, it is obvious that the former of these
equations is negative. Consequently, the slope of the reaction function is deter-
mined by the second order cross partial derivative. However, corollary 11 is not
su¢ cient to determine the sign in this case. Given assumptions A1 - A4, it is
obvious that it is trivial to observe that the sign is determined by
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

+ il;ljt=2V C

   ih;ljt=2V C + il;hjt=2V C
which is negative, for both rms i and j, if and only if
ih;ljt=2V C >
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

+ il;ljt=2V C   il;hjt=2V C
jl;hjt=2V C >
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

+ jl;ljt=2V C   jh;ljt=2V C
Where both of these conditions are met, both rms treat e¤ort as strategic sub-
stitutes.
7.8 Proof of Remark 13
Proof. Solving these comparative statics by Cramers rule obtains
de1i
dx
=
Ae1i x
jAj =

 @2ijt=1V C
@e2i @x
@2ijt=1V C
@e2i @e
2
j
 @2ijt=1V C
@ej2@x
@2j jt=1V C
@(e2j )
2

@2ijt=1V C
@(e2i )
2
@2ijt=1V C
@e2i @e
2
j
@2j jt=1V C
@e2i @e
2
j
@2j jt=1V C
@(e2j )
2
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where x = E, F . In both cases
jAj =

@2'1i
@(e1i )
2

@2'1j
@(e1j)
2
266664
(
(1  '1j)

ih;ljt=2V C   il;ljt=2V C

+'1j
h
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

  il;hjt=2V C
i )(
(1  '1i )

jl;hjt=2V C   jl;ljt=2V C

+'1i
h
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

  jh;ljt=2V C
i )
377775
 

@'1i
@e1i
2@'1j
@e1j
2
266664
( 
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

+ il;ljt=2V C

   ih;ljt=2V C + il;hjt=2V C
)
( 
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

+ jl;ljt=2V C

   jh;ljt=2V C + jl;hjt=2V C
)
377775
Whilst this looks rather unpleasant and impossible to sign, the condition for
uniqueness and stability,
R0i R0j < 1, yields

@2'1i
@(e1i )
2

@2'1j
@(e1j)
2
266664
(
(1  '1j)

ih;ljt=2V C   il;ljt=2V C

+'1j
h
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

  il;hjt=2V C
i )(
(1  '1i )

jl;hjt=2V C   jl;ljt=2V C

+'1i
h
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

  jh;ljt=2V C
i )
377775
>

@'1i
@e1i
2@'1j
@e1j
2
266664
( 
1
2

ih;hjt=2V Ci + ih;hjt=2V Cj

+ il;ljt=2V C

   ih;ljt=2V C + il;hjt=2V C
)
( 
1
2

jh;hjt=2V Ci + jh;hjt=2V Cj

+ jl;ljt=2V C

   jh;ljt=2V C + jl;hjt=2V C
)
377775
Consequently, the sign on both comparative statics, E and F , depend on jAeiEj,AejE, jAeiF j , AejF .
For the sake of brevity, we simply o¤er the equations here:
jAeiEj =  

@jjt=1V C
@(e1j)
2
8<:@'1i@e1i
0@ (1  '1j)@ih;ljt=2V C@E
+'1j

1
2

@ih;hjt=2V Ci
@E
+
@ih;hjt=2V Cj
@E

  @
i
l;hjt=2V C
@E
 1A9=;
+

@ijt=1V C
@e1i@e
1
j
8><>:@'
1
j
@e1j
0B@ (1  '1i )@
j
l;hjt=2V C
@E
+'1i

1
2

@jh;hjt=2V Ci
@E
+
@jh;hjt=2V Cj
@E

  @
j
h;ljt=2V C
@E
 1CA
9>=>;
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AejE =  @ijt=1V C@(e1i )2
8><>:@'
1
j
@e1j
0B@ (1  '1i )@
j
l;hjt=2V C
@E
+'1i

1
2

@jh;hjt=2V Ci
@E
+
@jh;hjt=2V Cj
@E

  @
j
h;ljt=2V C
@E
 1CA
9>=>;
+

@jjt=1V C
@e1j@e
1
i
8<:@'1i@e1i
0@ (1  '1i )@ih;ljt=2V C@E
+'1i

1
2

@ih;hjt=2V Ci
@E
+
@ih;hjt=2V Cj
@E

  @
i
l;hjt=2V C
@E
 1A9=;
jAeiF j =  

@jjt=1V C
@(e1j)
2
8<:@'1i@e1i
0@ (1  '1j)@ih;ljt=2V C@F
+'1j

1
2

@ih;hjt=2V Ci
@F
+
@ih;hjt=2V Cj
@F

  @
i
l;hjt=2V C
@F
 1A9=;
+

@ijt=1V C
@e1i@e
1
j
8><>:@'
1
j
@e1j
0B@ (1  '1i )@
j
l;hjt=2V C
@F
+'1i

1
2

@jh;hjt=2V Ci
@F
+
@jh;hjt=2V Cj
@F

  @
j
h;ljt=2V C
@F
 1CA
9>=>;
AejF  =  @ijt=1V C@(e1i )2
8><>:@'
1
j
@e1j
0B@ (1  '1i )@
j
l;hjt=2V C
@E
+'1i

1
2

@jh;hjt=2V Ci
@E
+
@jh;hjt=2V Cj
@E

  @
j
h;ljt=2V C
@E
 1CA
9>=>;
+

@jjt=1V C
@e1j@e
1
i
8<:@'1i@e1i
0@ (1  '1j)@ih;ljt=2V C@E
+'1j

1
2

@ih;hjt=2V Ci
@E
+
@ih;hjt=2V Cj
@E

  @
i
l;hjt=2V C
@E
 1A9=;
Unfortunately, given that it is not possible to determine the magnitude of the rst
order conditions with respect to E or F , it is not possible to sign these equations.
7.9 Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. Using Cramers rule we observe
de1i
ds
=
Ae1i s
jAj =

 @2ijt=1V C
@e2i @s
@2ijt=1V C
@e2i @e
2
j
 @2ijt=1V C
@ej2@s
@2j jt=1V C
@(e2j )
2

@2ijt=1V C
@(e2i )
2
@2ijt=1V C
@e2i @e
2
j
@2j jt=1V C
@e2i @e
2
j
@2j jt=1V C
@(e2j )
2
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where jAj is identical to that in remark 13. Thus, it is only the signs on
Ae1i s andAe1js that are important. With come manipulation we obtain
jAeisj =  

@jjt=1V C
@(e1j)
2
(
@'1i
@e1i
 
(1  '1j)
@ih;ljt=2V C
@s
+
1
2
'1j
@ih;hjt=2V Ci
@s
!)
+

@ijt=1V C
@e1i@e
1
j
(
@'1j
@e1j
 
(1  '1i )
@jl;hjt=2V C
@s
+
1
2
'1i
@jh;hjt=2V Cj
@s
!)
Aejs =  @ijt=1V C@(e1i )2
(
@'1j
@e1j
 
(1  '1i )
@jl;hjt=2V C
@s
+
1
2
'1i
@jh;hjt=2V Cj
@s
!)
+

@jjt=1V C
@e1j@e
1
i
(
@'1i
@e1i
 
(1  '1j)
@ih;ljt=2V C
@s
+
1
2
'1j
@ih;hjt=2V Ci
@s
!)
where
@ix;yjt=2V C
@s
< 0 8 x; y 2 fl; hg
Therefore, when rms treat e¤ort as strategic complements, or
@2ijt=1NV C
@(e2i )
2
< 0;
@2ijt=1NV C
@e1i@e
1
j
> 0
we nd jAeisj and
Aejs are both strictly negative. Thus,
de1i
ds
< 0
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